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Abstract 
This paper reports on the effects of LSD on mental time travel during spontaneous 
mentation. Twenty healthy volunteers participated in a placebo-controlled crossover 
study, incorporating intravenous administration of LSD (75 μg) and placebo (saline) 
prior to functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Six independent, blind judges 
analysed mentation reports acquired during structured interviews performed shortly 
after the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scans (approximately 2.5 h post-
administration). Within each report, specific linguistic references to mental spaces for the 
past, present and future were identified. Results revealed significantly fewer mental 
spaces for the past under LSD and this effect correlated with the general intensity of the 
drug’s subjective effects. No differences in the number of mental spaces for the present 
or future were observed. Consistent with the previously proposed role of the default-
mode network (DMN) in autobiographical memory recollection and ruminative thought, 
decreased resting-state functional connectivity (RSFC) within the DMN correlated with 
decreased mental time travel to the past. These results are discussed in relation to 
potential therapeutic applications of LSD and related psychedelics, e.g. in the treatment 
of depression, for which excessive reflection on one’s past, likely mediated by DMN 
functioning, is symptomatic.  
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Introduction 
Lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) is a semi-synthetic tryptamine hallucinogen or classic 
‘psychedelic’ with a rich pharmacology. Its characteristic psychological effects are thought to be 
mediated by serotonin 2A receptor agonism (Nichols, 2004). However, the connections between 
the neurobiological and the psychological effects of LSD are complex and still poorly understood. 
To help bridge this gap, the current study sought to integrate neurobiological data from functional 
brain imaging with data derived from mentation reports collected 2.5 h after administration of 
LSD and (separately) placebo. Linguistic analyses of mentation reports have previously been used 
to quantify psychological phenomena such as motor imagery, hallucinations, and recently mental 
time travel to the future (Speth and Speth, 2015c; Speth et al., 2013, 2015, 2016). The present 
crossover study used a linguistic tool to analyse references to mental time travel under LSD and 
placebo in the language of the mentation reports. 
Mental time travel refers to the ability of humans to mentally project themselves 
backwards and forwards in time, to recollect aspects of past autobiographical episodes or imagine 
future experiences (Schacter et al., 2007; Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997, 2007; Tulving, 1984, 
2002, 2005). Previous research has linked spontaneous mental time travel, as it occurs during 
mind-wandering, to a particular brain network, known as the default-mode network (DMN: 
Mason et al, 2007; Raichle, 2015). The DMN is a network of hub regions that show strong 
structural and functional connections associated with various meta-cognitive processes (Spreng 
et al., 2009), including autobiographical memory retrieval and envisioning of the future (Addis 
and Schacter, 2008; Buckner et al., 2008; Schacter et al., 2012; Spreng and Grady, 2010; Wagner 
et al., 2005). The frequency of incidences of mental time travel has been found to correlate 
positively with DMN resting-state functional connectivity (RSFC; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010). 
More frequent mind-wandering has been found to correlate with low mood (Killingsworth and 
Gilbert, 2010). Increased DMN RSFC has been found in depression (Greicius et al., 2007), 
particularly in relation to ruminative thought (Berman et al., 2011), which typically takes the 
form of reflecting on one’s self in the past. Conversely, decreased DMN RSFC has been observed 
in the psychedelic state (Carhart-Harris et al, 2012a; Palhano-Fontes et al., 2015); and current 
investigations are underway into the antidepressant potential of psychedelics (Baumeister et al., 
2014; Osorio Fde et al., 2015). 
An often reported feature of the psychedelic experience is a breakdown or decomposition 
of the sense of ‘self’ particularly at higher doses. This phenomenon is also known both colloquially 
(Turton et al., 2014) and academically (Lebedev et al., 2015), as ‘ego-dissolution’ or ‘ego-
disintegration’. However, defining and quantifying this phenomenon is a challenge (Carhart-
Harris et al., 2015; Lebedev et al., 2015). The results of the present study may help these 
investigations, especially in terms of shedding light onto a possible reduction in mental time 
travel to the past under LSD. The dependence of a sense of identity on the continuing access to 
and rehearsal of autobiographical information has been well documented (Pasupathi and Hoyt, 
2009). A secure sense of self or ego may therefore depend on a continuing input or ‘feed’ from 
autobiographical memory into consciousness (Fivush and Nelson, 2006; Turton et al., 2014). 
Recent neurophysiological evidence suggests that LSD reduces functional connectivity within the 
DMN (Carhart-Harris et al., 2015). Since the DMN appears to be closely involved in mental time 
travel (Buckner et al, 2009; Spreng et al., 2009), in particular to the past (Buckner et al., 2009), 
but is ‘disintegrated’ under psychedelics (Carhart-Harris et al. 2012a; Palhano-Fontes et al., 2015) 
it was predicted that participants would engage less in mental time travel under LSD than placebo 
and that this effect would correlate with DMN disintegration. 
 
Method 
Quantitative linguistic analysis was conducted on transcriptions of participants’ verbally 
delivered mentation reports collected after LSD or placebo administration. This third person 
method of analysis is intended to objectively measure mental events as they become expressed 
in the natural language of the first person report (for further explanation see Speth and Speth, 
2015d, 2016; Speth et al., 2013, 2015, 2016). This study investigated whether the mentation 
reports differed in the number of linguistic constructs (referred to as ‘theta roles’ and ‘mental 
spaces’, see below for definitions) that indicated references to mental time travel to the past or 
future, or thoughts about the present. Six raters were instructed to analyse a total of 77 mentation 
reports. The raters were blind in so far as they were not informed to which condition (LSD or 
placebo) the individual reports referred. 
 
Participants 
Twenty healthy volunteers, recruited to the study via word-of-mouth, participated in the study 
(four females, mean age=30.9±7.8, range=22–47), and 19 volunteers were included in the 
analyses reported below (one male was excluded due to an absent report from the LSD condition). 
Due to the potentially anxiogenic effects of classic psychedelics in a neuroimaging environment, 
all participants were required to have had at least one previous experience with a classic 
psychedelic drug (mean estimated LSD uses=14±17.8, range=0–70, see below for other 
psychedelics) but not within 14 days of the first dosing session (mean last use of 
LSD=899.3±1363, range=14–5400 days). Self-estimates of other drug use were as follows 
(mean±standard deviation (SD), range): weekly alcohol units=10.3±9; daily cigarettes=0.3±1.1, 
0–5; cannabis uses=705±639, 30–2000; 3,4-methylenedioxy-methamphetamine (MDMA) 
uses=27±24, 2–100; psilocybin/magic mushroom uses=9.4±7.8, 1–35; ketamine uses=3.6±5, 0–
20; cocaine uses=9.6±9.4, 0–30. Previous drug use did not correlate with the primary study 
outcomes. 
 
Experimental design 
The current study was placebo-controlled and used a within-subjects/cross-over, balanced-order 
design. The study received a favourable opinion from the National Research Ethics Service 
(NRES) ethics committee London-West London and was conducted in accordance with Good 
Clinical Practice guidelines, the National Health Service Research Governance Framework, and 
complied with the ethical standards of the declaration of Helsinki (1975, revised 2008). Imperial 
College London sponsored the research and a Home Office license was obtained for research with 
Schedule I drugs. All volunteers were sent a study information sheet and asked to read it before 
their screening visit. 
Volunteers made three study visits that comprised screening, dosing session one, and 
dosing session two. Dosing sessions were separated by at least two weeks in every case and the 
order of receipt of LSD was balanced, i.e. half of the volunteers received LSD in dosing session one 
and half in dosing session two. Volunteers were blind to the dosing order but the research team 
were not. Dosing order was determined sequentially so that all odd-numbered volunteers (i.e. S1 
was the first volunteer recruited and S20 was the last) received LSD in dosing session one, 
whereas all even-numbered volunteers received it in dosing session two. 
 
Screening 
Prior to study enrolment, volunteers attended a screening visit at the Wellcome Trust Clinical 
Research Facility (WTCRF) at the Hammersmith Hospital in West London. The study design, 
procedures, and psychological effects of LSD were explained and signed informed consent was 
taken. Key exclusion criteria were: <21 years of age, personal history of diagnosed psychiatric 
illness, immediate family history of a psychotic disorder, an absence of previous experience with 
a classic psychedelic drug (e.g. LSD, mescaline, psilocybin/magic mushrooms or 
dimethyltryptamine/ayahuasca), pregnancy, problematic alcohol use or a medically significant 
condition rendering the volunteer unsuitable for the study. 
 
Experimental procedure 
Participants were asked to arrive at the study centre (Cardiff University’s Brain Research Imaging 
Centre) at a specific time at or before 09:00. A urine test for drugs abuse and pregnancy (where 
relevant) was carried out. Participants were re-briefed about the procedures for the day and any 
recent drug and alcohol use was documented. The study physician inserted a cannula into a vein 
in the antecubital fossa in preparation for intravenous dosing and the volunteer was encouraged 
to relax prior to drug/placebo administration. The dose of LSD was 75 µcg (i.v.) in 10 mL saline. 
Previous research has found this dose to produce robust psychological effects that are generally 
well tolerated (Carhart-Harris et al., 2015). Placebo was 10 mL saline (i.v.). Both solutions were 
infused over 2 min. 
After dosing, volunteers completed a functional neuroimaging protocol. In brief, subjects 
spent a period habituating to a scanner environment in a mock magnetic resonance imaging 
(MRI) scanner before entering a real MRI scanner (one hour post-dosing). The MRI scanning 
session lasted for one hour after which the first of two structured interviews was performed. 
The present analyses are concerned with the mentation reports obtained from 
participants at the beginning of structured interviews, performed soon (within 30 min) after the 
functional MRI (fMRI) scanning, ~2.5 h post-dosing. Participants were prompted to report on 
their mentation by means of four different question asked successively by the investigator (‘What 
was it like in the scanner?’, ‘Did you daydream in the scanner, and if so, what did you daydream?’, 
‘Was the experience dreamlike at all, and if so, how?’, ‘Did you experience any personal thoughts 
or feelings at any point?’). 
The size of the subjective effect of LSD was assessed by a visual analogue scale with 20 
increments. The subjective effects of LSD were detected approximately 10 min post-infusion, 
peaked approximately 120 min post-infusion (towards the end of the first scan, prior to the first 
interview), and subsided to a negligible level approximately 7–8 h post-infusion. Participants 
were discharged by the study physician when they were considered to be functioning normally. 
Volunteers were either picked-up by a friend or partner, ordered a taxi or were accompanied 
home by the research team as far as was feasible. Volunteers were asked to contact a researcher 
via phone or text message once they had arrived home safely. A study psychiatrist was present 
for the duration of each dosing session and one researcher was allocated to each participant to 
assist them throughout the day. For each participant, the same researcher was present for both 
dosing days. 
 
fMRI 
fMRI was performed on a 3T GE HDx system. Two blood-oxygenlevel dependent (BOLD)-
weighted fMRI scans were acquired using a gradient echo-planar imaging sequence, repetition 
time (TR)/echo time (TE)=2000/35 ms, field-of-view=220 mm, 64×64 acquisition matrix, 
parallel acceleration factor=2, 90° flip angle. Each of the two BOLD scan was 7:20 min in duration. 
Conditions were eyes-closed and task-free, with the instructions: ‘Please keep still with your eyes 
shut at all times and try not to fall asleep’. Detailed descriptions of the pre-processing involved in 
these analyses will be reported in a separate publication and can be found in the Supplementary 
Material. 
A template DMN was acquired by using independent component analysis (ICA) 
performed on data derived separately as part of the Human Connectome Project (HCP) (Glasser 
et al., 2013). All scans were band-passed filtered (0.01–0.08 Hz) and Multivariate Exploratory 
Linear Optimized Decomposition into Independent Components, as implemented in FMRIB 
Software Library was used to extract 20 ICA components. A single canonical DMN was identified 
and used in subsequent calculations of intra-DMN connectivity. DMN maps for the two conditions 
(LSD and placebo), were calculated and contrasted. Paired t-tests were used to calculate the 
difference in intra-DMN RSFC between conditions. Reductions in intra-DMN RSFC by LSD, i.e. as 
changes in z-scores, were defined as DMN disintegration and used in subsequent correlation 
analyses. Five participants’ data could not be included in these analyses due to one participant 
not completing the fMRI scan and four others showing excessive motion artefacts. 
 
Mentation reports 
Specific linguistic references to mental time travel to the past or future, as well as thoughts about 
present scenarios, were quantified in the participants’ transcribed mentation reports. The 
linguistic tool developed for this quantification process is partly grammatical and partly 
cognitive-semantic. The grammatical part of the tool is based on linguistic theta theory (Gruber, 
2001; Reinhart, 2002, Reinhart and Siloni, 2005) and measures grammatical agency connected to 
the semantic field of cognition. It has been used in a different context to successfully link numbers 
of linguistic references to simulated motor activity in mentation reports with motor cortical 
activation of the respective state of consciousness (Speth et al., 2013), to investigate the effect of 
transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) on motor imagery (Speth et al., 2015), and to 
measure auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) as well as memory in different states of 
consciousness (Speth and Speth, 2015a; Speth et al., 2016). The second part of the current tool is 
based on the cognitive-semantic theory of mental spaces by Fauconnier and Turner (Fauconnier, 
1994; Fauconnier and Turner, 1997): the method of mental spaces analysis was developed to 
measure if instances of grammatical cognitive agency introduced references to past, present and 
future scenarios. 
 
Analysis of mental spaces hosting past, present or future scenarios 
In linguistic theta system theory, the initiator of an event takes on a specific thematic (theta) role 
within a sentence or phrase (Gruber, 2001; Reinhart, 2002, Reinhart and Siloni 2005). He or she 
is the agent who performs an action. In the phrase ‘Mimi throws a ball’, Mimi is the agent. The 
agent is defined through his or her relationship to the predicate of a phrase: He or she is 
performing the action described by the predicate. Mimi is the one who is doing something. The 
agent is described by a noun phrase, but the agent does not necessarily correlate with the 
grammatical subject. Consider the following phrases, where Mimi is the agent in both (a) and (b), 
but the syntactic subject only in the active version (a). 
    (a) Mimi opens the box. 
    (b) The box is opened by Mimi. 
The current study focuses on a special variety of agency: cognitive agency, which is 
defined as such agency that is related to the semantic field of cognition. The cognitive agent is the 
one who is carrying out a cognitive act such as thinking, imagining, remembering or planning. The 
following phrases (c) to (i) contain instances of (simulated) cognitive agency as they occur in 
mentation reports: 
    (c) I was thinking, you know, just thinking about things. 
    (d) I just realized that I missed my Italian class yesterday. 
    (e) Trying to figure out what went wrong during my date the other day. 
    (f) Just relaxing, contemplating if I… should I be helping Anna and Jill with the dishes 
or be at the gym instead of sitting around. 
    (g) Thinking about the people in Africa, and what they must feel like fearing that Ebola 
virus. 
    (h) Asking myself if Mimi is going to enjoy the party. 
    (i) Wondering if I can ace the exam tomorrow. 
 
Often cognitive agents build what linguists call mental spaces (Fauconnier, 1994; Fauconnier and 
Turner, 1997). The notion of mental spaces is borrowed from the philosophical concept of 
possible worlds – although mental spaces are understood as essentially cognitive scenarios that 
are not necessarily attributed a specific metaphysical value, and nor do they have to be logically 
consistent. Mental spaces can host past, present and future scenarios. Examples (c), (d), and (e) 
present cognitive agencies building a mental space for the past. The cognitive agencies in (f) and 
(g) each host a mental space for the present, and the cognitive agencies in (h) and (i) host mental 
spaces for the future. 
Mental spaces are marked via (a) grammatical clues (‘going to enjoy the party’), (b) 
immediate semantic clues (‘yesterday’, ‘the other day’, ‘tomorrow’), or (c) contextual clues 
(someone is ‘sitting around’ pondering if he or she should rather be active in terms of ‘helping 
Anna and Jill’ or by being ‘at the gym’ – or someone is picturing the current situation in Africa, 
contemplating what it must be like for the Africans). In this study, a space built by the cognitive 
agent is defined as a past, present or future scenario in relation to the cognitive action carried out 
during the mentation period on which he or she is reporting. 
 
Report rating instructions 
All raters were asked to judge all reports. Raters were given a hard copy of the transcribed reports 
and an instruction manual in which they were asked to identify instances of cognitive agency and 
ensuing mental spaces in the reports. The instruction manual contained the brief definitions of 
cognitive agency and mental spaces that are given above. Raters were issued with a rating table 
which contained different columns in which raters were asked to further classify instances of the 
grammatical perspective of the cognitive agency (first person singular or plural, second person 
singular or plural, third person singular or plural). The mental spaces were to be classified as past, 
present, or future mental spaces, in relation to the cognitive agency itself, according to the 
definitions given in the instruction manual. Raters were informed that mentation reports are 
often transcribed in a way that the original, natural speech is preserved. They would therefore 
encounter elliptical or grammatically ill-formed sentences, and there would be cases where they 
would be unsure about their rating decisions. Raters were asked to use their best judgment and 
decide how to deal with such particular phrases, as not all possible instances of cognitive agency 
and ensuing mental spaces possible in natural speech can be pre-defined. Importantly, mentation 
reports did not provide overt statements regarding the study condition (i.e. whether the report 
was delivered under LSD or not) that would have compromised the raters’ blind. 
 
Statistical analyses 
Word count per report was compared between LSD and placebo condition by means of a 
repeated-measures student’s t-test. Identified instances of cognitive agency were aggregated for 
every report, separately for every rater. By calculating the mean rating of all raters for each 
report, one single rating value was assigned for each report. A one-way repeated-measures 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to test for an omnibus effect of LSD 
on the number of cognitive agencies referring to the present, past, and future. Where appropriate, 
repeated-measures student’s t-tests were used post-hoc to investigate any interactions. In 
addition, a planned comparison was carried out to assess the effect of LSD on cognitive agencies 
referring to the past to elucidate the potential relationship between the psychedelic effect of ‘ego-
dissolution’ (Lebedev et al., 2015) and the hypothesised dependence of a sense of identity on the 
conscious access of autobiographical information (Fivush and Nelson, 2006; Turton et al., 2014). 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient was used for correlational analyses. 
 
Results 
A total of 38 mentation reports were collected approximately 2.5 h post dosing (of either LSD or 
placebo), 19 reports were collected from the LSD condition, and 19 from the placebo condition. 
Raters identified a mean of 2.03 (SD=1.67) cognitive agencies per report. The agreement on the 
number of cognitive agencies per report between the six raters was very high (Cronbach’s 
α=0.92). Linguistic samples from reports collected after LSD and placebo can be seen in Table 1. 
In general, participants delivered longer reports (in terms of word count) after LSD 
(Mean, M=252.11, SD=146.88) than after placebo (M=155.578, SD=114.77; t(18)=2.618, p=0.017, 
d=0.73). An omnibus analysis for the effect of LSD on mental spaces for the past, present, and 
future did not reach significance (F(3,16)=1.91; p=0.168). The planned comparison, however, 
showed a significant effect of LSD on mental spaces for the past (t(18)=2.5, p=0.022, d=0.85). 
Contrary to the effect of LSD on general report length, there were fewer references to the past 
after LSD (M=0.079, SD=0.2) than after placebo (M=0.71, SD=1.04) (see  1). There were no 
significant differences in the number of references to the present (placebo: M=1, SD=0.9; LSD: 
M=1.04, SD=0.79; t(18)=−0.114, p=0.911) and future (placebo: M=0.64, SD=0.63; LSD: M=0.51, 
SD=1.08; t(18)=0.5, p=0.624).  
 
Figure 1: Mean number of instances of cognitive agency referring to past, present or future spaces per report ~2.5 h after 
lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) or placebo administration. Error bars indicate standard error of the mean. *p<0.05. 
A correlation analysis was run to look at the relationship between the overall intensity of 
the subjective effects of LSD, rated during MRI scanning, and the effect on reduced cognitive 
agencies connected to mental spaces for the past in the post-MRI interview. The correlation was 
in the predicted direction (i.e. more intense subjective effects predicting fewer cognitive agencies 
connected to mental spaces for the past) and almost reached significance in a two-tailed t-test 
(r=0.34, r²=0.17, p=0.076). 
A further correlational analysis was run to look at the relationship of between-condition 
differences in within-DMN RSFC or ‘integrity’ and between-condition differences in the number 
of cognitive agencies connected to mental spaces for the past. Again, the correlation was in the 
predicted direction (i.e. greater DMN disintegration under LSD predicted fewer cognitive 
agencies connected to mental spaces for the past under the drug) and almost reached significance 
in a two-tailed t-test (r=0.51, r²=0.26, p=0.054), see Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Decreased default-mode network (DMN) integrity predicts fewer cognitive agencies connected to mental spaces for 
the past under lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) (r=0.51, p=0.054). The DMN template is shown in purple on the three axial 
slices and the decrease in DMN integrity under LSD is shown in light blue (cluster-corrected, p<0.05). 
Lifetime uses of LSD, psilocybin and cannabis and time since last-use of these drugs did 
not correlate with the between-condition differences in mental time travel to the past (p>0.05), 
nor DMN integrity (p>0.05). Weekly alcohol-use and time since last drink also did not correlate 
with the main outcomes (p>0.05). 
 
Discussion 
This study sought to assess the effects of LSD on spontaneous mental time travel and relate this 
to the drug’s neurobiological effects. Results revealed a selective reduction in the number of 
linguistic references to mental time travel to the past under LSD. Moreover, there was a 
relationship between the general intensity of LSD’s subjective effects and the reduction in mental 
time travel to the past, further supporting the assumption that the effect was driven by LSD. 
Results provide insight into the underlying mechanisms of this effect, as decreased DMN integrity 
correlated with reduced mental time travel to the past. 
Prior research links the DMN to autobiographical memory (Spreng et al., 2009) and self-
reflection (Gusnard et al., 2001), as psychological functions relevant to the notion of the self or 
ego (Carhart-Harris and Friston, 2010). This fits in with the present data on the correlation 
between decreased integrity within this particular brain network and reduced time travel to the 
past. The DMN appears to subserve spontaneous cognition and particularly cognition that has an 
introspective and itinerant (i.e. freely-wandering) quality (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010). 
Many brain networks receive a driving input from the external world (e.g. for the visual 
system this input is light activating cells in the retina) and therefore possess a relatively secure 
anchor point. The DMN, however, does not possess such an obvious anchor point. If an equivalent 
‘driving input’ was to exist for the DMN, it would likely have an endogenous or intrinsic origin 
(e.g. a structure or system already within the brain) and be hierarchically inferior (e.g. 
evolutionarily older) to the cortical DMN. The DMN is known to possess strong anatomical and 
functional connections with the hippocampus, via the parahippocampal cortex (Ward et al., 
2014). Hippocampal to cortical-DMN RSFC has been found to correlate with the prevalence of 
mental time travel (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010); moreover, given the classic association between 
the hippocampus and autobiographical memory (e.g. Fletcher et al., 1997), it seems logical to 
suspect that the hippocampal-DMN circuit is important, not just for autobiographical memory 
recollection, but for the preservation of the sense of self or ego. Support for this hypothesis is 
provided by evidence that the hippocampal-DMN circuit undergoes significant development 
during maturation (Supekar et al., 2010; Xiao et al., 2015), and that the psychedelic, psilocybin, 
decreases parahippocampal to cortex RSFC in a manner that correlates with ego-dissolution 
(Lebedev et al., 2015). Further work is required to test and develop the hypothesis that the 
hippocampus-DMN circuit is important for the maintenance of one’s sense of self and its reliance 
on autobiographical information. 
The present results may help to extend our knowledge of the psychological effects of LSD 
and could inspire a new perspective on the construct of ‘ego-dissolution’. Ego-dissolution is an 
abstract construct, yet it is generally considered to be an important feature of the psychedelic 
experience, especially at higher doses, and it is often described by users of psychedelics (Turton 
et al., 2014). Moreover, the phenomenology of psychedelic-induced ego-dissolution overlaps with 
the phenomenology of ego-disturbances in early psychosis (Lebedev et al., 2015; Nelson et al., 
2012; Schneider, 1959), as well as classic accounts of ‘self-loss’ in spontaneous religious, spiritual 
or mystical experiences (James and Bradley, 2012). However, although the experience of ego-
dissolution is often described in relation to the psychedelic experience, it is not always clear what 
is meant by this. It has yet to be investigated if the experience of ego-dissolution under 
psychedelics is conceptually similar to ego-disturbances in psychosis: Self-disorder in psychosis 
focuses on a basic, minimal, or core self, also known as ipseity (Nelson et al., 2014; Zahavi, 2005). 
Further studies could compare phenomenological similarities and differences between the 
concept of ego disturbances and the concept of ego dissolution, using the linguistic tool presented 
in the current study. If similarities were to be observed, this would substantiate the LSD state as 
a model of psychosis (Carhart-Harris et al. 2015). 
The notion of ‘the narrative self’ and ‘narrative identity’ (Habermas and Bluck, 2000) may 
be particularly relevant to the findings of the present study and how they relate to psychedelic-
induced ego-dissolution. The importance of accessing and rehearsing autobiographical 
information for the development of a narrative self has been well demonstrated (Pasupathi and 
Hoyt, 2009). Thus, the existence of a secure sense of self or ego may depend on a regular input or 
‘feed’ from autobiographical memory into consciousness (Fivush and Nelson, 2006), and if this 
feed is suspended, then the self/ego may collapse (Turton et al., 2014). Based on prior findings 
(Lebedev et al., 2015), we speculate that the hippocampal-DMN circuit may be an important part 
of such a ‘feed’. 
The therapeutic potential of LSD for psychotherapy is currently being revisited (Gasser et 
al., 2014). LSD has a history of use as an adjunct to psychotherapy, and was originally thought to 
lower psychological defences and facilitate emotional insight and release, i.e. ‘catharsis’ (Cohen, 
1967; Kaelen et al., 2015). The present finding of decreased mental time travel to the past under 
LSD may seem contradictory when one considers that a major rationale for using LSD in 
psychotherapy is that it can facilitate emotional insight, often via stimulating personal memories 
and associated affect (Cohen, 1967). Indeed, patients undergoing psychedelic-assisted 
psychotherapy often report re-experiencing past memories with an unusual vividness, an 
experience sometimes referred to as ‘reliving’ (Grof, 1979; Sandison, 1954) and facilitated 
recollection of positive episodic memories was demonstrated in a controlled experiment with 
psilocybin (Carhart-Harris et al., 2012b). 
How can such improved access to autobiographical memory be reconciled with the 
present finding of less spontaneous reflections on the past under LSD? An explanation for this 
paradox may be found in the nature of the phenomena themselves, as well as how they are tested 
and measured. For example, spontaneous recollections or relivings that occur in early 
psychedelic-psychotherapy often relate to highly salient, personal themes, e.g. familial and/or 
intimate relationships and highly salient and/or traumatic events that may be temporally remote, 
e.g. sometimes dating back to childhood (Grof, 1979; Sandison, 1954), such as the following: 
"Standing about 4 yards away was my father with his fishing rod…. The sun was shining and the 
whole scene was peaceful and lovely… all the rest of the day and ever since that picture has 
remained with me as something too precious to part with because my father has died just before 
my illness. That is three years this year, and owing to his illness we hadn’t fished for some two 
years…. (Sandison et al., 1954: 497)." 
Yet the kind of comments coded as reflections on the past in the present study appear to 
be less emotionally potent and are typically more recent: ‘Thinking about… random stuff which 
happened in the last few days’ (Placebo example, Table 1). Thus, during normal waking 
consciousness, mental time travel to the past may occur with greater regularly than in the 
psychedelic state; however, the content of these reflections may be more anodyne and (ego) 
syntonic or unthreatening. Moreover, it should be acknowledged that psychedelic-psychotherapy 
occurs in a relatively distinctive context, i.e. a patient with mental health problems receives 
treatment with a psychotherapeutic focus. Further work is required to investigate whether the 
present findings in healthy volunteers can be replicated in a patient population in a therapeutic 
context. 
Where facilitated autobiographical memory recollection has been demonstrated in 
controlled research with a psychedelic (Carhart-Harris et al., 2012b), participants were explicitly 
cued to recollect positive episodic memories. This is quite a different procedure to coding natural 
speech for spontaneous reflections on the past, present and future, and thus, the outcomes 
derived from these two different approaches cannot be easily compared. One should also 
consider that individuals demonstrate hypersuggestibility under psychedelics (Carhart-Harris et 
al., 2015), and thus, reports of psychedelic-enhanced autobiographical memory recollection in 
controlled studies (where hypotheses may be easy to intuit) may be biased or, at least 
confounded, by enhanced suggestibility (Carhart-Harris et al., 2015). Measures of spontaneous 
cognition (as were employed here) may be particularly useful and informative in this regard, 
since the experimental aims and hypotheses motivating these measures are effectively hidden. 
The raters using the tool of quantitative linguistic analysis in this study evaluated it as 
easy to apply, and indeed the inter-rater reliability was very high. This tool has been used 
effectively in previous studies to differentiate between (altered) states of consciousness (e.g. in 
sleep and waking states, and under electrostimulation; Speth and Speth, 2015b, 2016; Speth et 
al., 2015) as well as here with LSD. This helps to develop its utility as a means to quantify markers 
of different states of consciousness. 
Mentation reports produced post-LSD were longer and more elaborate than those given 
post-placebo. This ties in with findings from other studies of altered states of consciousness, and 
especially dream research: mentation reports conceived after forced awakenings from rapid eye 
movement (REM) sleep are known to be longer than reports conceived after non-REM sleep or 
sleep onset (Stickgold et al., 2001). This was one of the reasons why REM dreams have been 
interpreted as emotionally richer and more vivid. Their hallucinatory quality has been compared 
to acute states of psychosis (Hobson, 1997, 2004), as has the psychedelic state (Carhart-Harris, 
2007, Carhart-Harris et al., 2014). It is thus not surprising that a (hallucinatory) psychedelic 
waking experience likewise results in longer reports than a normal relaxed waking experience. It 
could prove fruitful to consciousness research if the similarities and differences between 
spontaneously occurring hallucinatory states (e.g. REM dreaming or hypnagogic hallucinations) 
and pharmacologically induced hallucinatory states (e.g. after LSD or psilocybin) were further 
explored by applying quantitative linguistic analysis and related quantitative tools, ideally in 
physiology-monitored experimental settings and within-subject designs (Carhart-Harris and 
Nutt, 2014). 
It is important to highlight some limitations of the present study. One of these relates to 
the fact that participants were intoxicated on LSD when asked to deliver their retrospective 
accounts of their experience in the MRI scanner. This makes it difficult to determine whether the 
main effects reported here (i.e. reduced mental time travel to the past) are reflective of the acute 
intoxication state (which we assume) or the content of the participants’ descriptions about their 
experiences in the scanner, and so the nature of their retrospective thinking. Since the present 
analyses cannot make this differentiation, one way to address it in future studies might be to ask 
participants about their present state, e.g. with questions such as ‘How do you feel right now?’. 
There is also an important limitation which is related to the correlation analysis. It has 
been argued before that sample sizes in neuroimaging studies are commonly too small to yield 
reliable, replicable findings and that many reported positive outcomes may therefore be false 
positives (Button et al., 2013). It would be sensible to caution therefore that the present study’s 
sample size of n=15 (for the fMRI) may be too small to demonstrate a reliable relationship 
between individual differences in DMN connectivity and mental time travel and greater sample 
sizes are therefore advised for future studies. 
Another important limitation of the present study’s findings must be considered. Namely, 
it could be inferred that the observed reduction in reflection on the past under LSD is not the 
result of a specific action of the drug on this specific measure but rather a product of a more 
general effect of LSD on cognition. If this interpretation were true, any intoxicant (i.e. not just 
LSD) that alters cognition in a profound way, might impact on mentation about the past. However, 
if this were true, then it might also apply to mentation about the future, but there was no effect of 
LSD on this measure. Moreover, the reduced mentation about the past was not caused by 
participants simply reporting less in their interviews on LSD; in fact, LSD interviews were 
significantly more elaborate and lengthy than the placebo ones (see Supplementary Material for 
a fuller discussion of this matter). This alternative explanation for the present results could be 
explored by examining the effects of other intoxicants, with quite different psychological effects 
to LSD (e.g. alcohol or amphetamine), on the same measures, to see whether consistent results 
are observed. Beyond pharmacological manipulations, the effects of other exhilarating 
experiences on the same measures might also be investigated. These important validity checks 
would inform on whether the effect of psychedelics on past-focused mentation is indeed exclusive 
to this class of drugs, or rather something more generally associated with intoxication and/or 
exhilarating experiences. 
If the reported effect of LSD on past-focused reflection is relatively exclusive to 
psychedelics, then this may say something more interesting about them. The therapeutic 
potential of psychedelics is currently being revisited, with promising preliminary results 
(Bogenschutz et al., 2015; Gasser et al., 2014; Grob et al., 2011; Osorio Fde et al., 2015). Inspired 
by the findings of neuroimaging research with psychedelics (Carhart-Harris et al., 2014), our 
team are currently investigating the antidepressant potential of psilocybin-assisted 
psychotherapy for treatment-resistant depression, and again, the initial results are very 
promising. fMRI studies with psilocybin (Carhart-Harris et al., 2012a), ayahuasca (Palhano-
Fontes et al., 2015) and LSD (Carhart-Harris, 2015) have all shown decreased DMN RSFC, as have 
fMRI studies with meditation (Brewer et al., 2011; Farb et al., 2007; Hasenkamp et al., 2012), 
whereas DMN RSFC has been found to be elevated in depression (Greicius et al., 2007), and to 
correlate positively with ruminative thinking (Berman et al., 2011). 
The present analyses found a decrease in mental time travel to the past under LSD. 
Previous work has shown that daydreaming about the past is associated with low mood 
(Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010) and popular treatments for depression, such as mindfulness-
based psychotherapy, encourage patients to adopt a more present-focused style of thinking 
(Shapiro et al., 2006). It is intriguing to consider whether psychedelics work in a similar way to 
mindfulness-based therapies; promoting a mental state that is less focused on the past and 
therefore less unhappy (Killingsworth and Gilbert, 2010) – and there is some recent evidence to 
support this (Soler et al. 2016). It would be interesting to extend this work to enquire whether 
any mindfulness-promoting effects of psychedelics are be mediated by decreases in intra-DMN 
functional connectivity. 
The present study has found decreased mentation on the past in conjunction with 
decreased DMN integrity under the acute effects of LSD; however, further work is now required 
to test whether the same effect can be observed after the acute effects of LSD have subsided. If 
the results of previous controlled studies with psychedelics (Griffiths et al., 2008), as well as 
subjective reports of participants from our own previous studies (Carhart-Harris et al., 2012a) 
are considered, then such enduring effects seem likely: "Ever since [the psilocybin session on] 
Thursday, I’d say I have found it much easier to engage in the moment – to attend to the here and 
now. Whether this be watching water in a fountain, or sitting in science talks and meetings this 
morning. There were some fountains in Cardiff and the water was being blown by the wind, 
allowing the sun to highlight the spray. I could have watched it for ages – somehow the beauty 
was enhanced…. Whatever it was, it has lasted – like the sun shining through the leaves this 
morning, it made me slow down my walk to work and enjoy the experience of it flickering over 
my face." 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, the present study sought to investigate the effect of LSD on mental time travel to 
the past, present and future. Results revealed a selective effect of LSD on mental spaces linked to 
the past, i.e. there were significantly fewer cases of mental time travel to the past under LSD than 
placebo, and this effect correlated with the general intensity of LSD’s subjective effects. These 
outcomes shed light on the phenomenon of ego-dissolution and specifically a decomposition of 
the ‘narrative-self’ or ‘narrative identity’, which is strongly associated with autobiographical 
thought (Pasupathi and Hoyt, 2009). A specific hypothesis was tested that this phenomenon 
relates to decreased DMN integrity, and this was supported by the data. The findings were 
discussed in relation to potential therapeutic applications of psychedelic drugs, with a particular 
focus on depression. Further research is required to investigate the robustness, reliability and 
specificity of the reported findings. 
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